Statement of the Problem

Conventional models are failing throughout the world. In the developed world, the welfare-state compensation model has been in retrenchment for some time, and the drawbacks of the neoliberal conception that has superseded it are increasingly evident. Yet there is no compelling alternative on offer. In the developing world, the conventional, tried-and-tested model of industrialization has run out of steam. In both sets of societies, a combination of technological and economic forces (in particular, globalization) is creating or exacerbating productive/technological dualism, with a segment of advanced production in metropolitan areas that thrives on the uncertainty generated by the knowledge economy coexisting with a mass of relatively less productive activities and communities that neither contributes to, nor benefits from, innovation. The sizes of these two sectors and the trajectories leading into them may vary, but otherwise the nature of the underlying problem seems to have converged in the developed and developing worlds.

This productive/technological dualism is in turn responsible for many of the ills these societies face: inequality, exclusion, spatial/social segmentation, loss of trust in elites/governments/experts, the populist backlash, and authoritarian politics. Left to their own devices, globalization and new technologies look likely to aggravate these divisions and the pathologies that flow from them.

Much of our policy conversation today focuses on solutions that elide the true source of the problem. Ex post redistribution through taxes and transfers accepts the productive structure as given, and merely ameliorates the results through handouts. Investments in education, universal basic income (UBI), and social wealth funds seek to enhance the endowments of the workforce, without ensuring productive integration. Broadly speaking, the same can be said about the Keynesian approach to job creation, through aggregate demand management. Keynesianism aims at static efficiency—closing the
gap between actual and potential output where the potential output is fixed enough to be precisely calculable. Dualism entrenched enough to shape long-term growth expectations—just the kind of structural deformation of the economy that most concerns us—cannot be addressed by demand management, short, perhaps, of mobilization for war. Though lax enforcement of antitrust laws may have contributed to the concentration of industry in recent decades, and exacerbated inequality by allowing oligopolists to increase their markups or use monopsony power in labor markets to drive down wages, redress through a new round of trust busting is at best a very partial solution to the larger problem, and then only in the long term.

What we seek to explore here is a set of interventions by the public sector—or its delegated agencies—directly in the productive sphere, and in direct collaboration with the most productive segments of the private sector. These interventions are targeted at expanding productive employment opportunities by supporting firms and workers in their efforts to acquire and extend the capacities needed to participate in the dynamic sector of the economy. We call it a strategy of “building a good jobs economy.”

The definition of “good job” is necessarily slippery. We have in mind in the first instance stable, formal-sector employment that comes with core labor protections such as safe working conditions, collective bargaining rights, and regulations against arbitrary dismissal. A good job allows at least a middle-class existence, by a region’s standards, with enough income for housing, food, transportation, education, and other family expenses, as well as some saving. More broadly, good jobs provide workers with clear career paths, possibilities of self-development, flexibility, responsibility, and fulfillment. The depth and range of such characteristics may depend on context: the prevailing levels of productivity and economic development, costs of living, prevailing income gaps, and so on. Further, a good job need not imply classical full-time employment and could permit job sharing and work flexibility. We expect each community to set its own standards and aspirations, which will evolve over time. In practice, the characterization of good jobs can be as “provisional” as many of the other features of the programs we will describe here.

Our approach has three, mutually reinforcing components: increasing the skill level and productivity of existing jobs, and the competitiveness of firms, for example through provision of extension services to improve management or cooperative programs to advance technology; increasing the number of good jobs by supporting start-ups, the expansion of existing, local firms or attracting investment by outsiders—what the many state and local programs (of greatly varying quality) currently directed to this last purpose refer to simply as “economic development”; and active labor market policies or work-
force development programs to help workers, especially from at-risk groups, master the skills required for good jobs. Redistribution, Keynesian demand management, and antitrust policies can and should be important complements to such interventions, but alone or in combination, they cannot be a substitute for them.

Public-private collaborations are at the heart of this strategy. Our focus is on the design principles needed to govern these collaborations. Such principles do not need to be invented from scratch. We argue that they can be borrowed from existing innovative governance arrangements that firms, regulators, and other public agencies have already developed in response to the market and technological uncertainties they face. These arrangements have not been typically deployed in pursuit of good jobs, but they can be adapted to that end.

Active labor market policies have begun to receive considerable attention. A number of studies have reviewed development experience on the ground with some resemblance to the good jobs program. Austin, Glaeser, and Summers (2018) survey “place-based policies” such as regionally targeted employment subsidies and infrastructure investment; Miller-Adams et al. (2019) review a program focused on creating good jobs in communities that face economic challenges; and Autor, Li, and Notowidigdo (2019) summarize evidence on the impact of educational and other interventions. A common theme is the interrelated and conditional nature of the remedies: very few program elements work off the shelf and reliably across diverse settings. For example, Miller-Adams et al. (2019) recommend differentiated strategies that combine skill development strategies (targeted at the local workforce) with programs to attract businesses (targeted at employers). They emphasize the provision of customized services to firms tailored to local conditions.

In view of the inherent uncertainty about “what works,” we focus here not on specific interventions or policies, but on a meta-intervention regime for generating good jobs in many different areas of economic activity. We describe a set of design principles for building dynamic governance arrangements that sustain public-private collaborations under conditions of uncertainty and learning, through ongoing review and revision of objectives, instruments, and benchmarks.

The most familiar variant of a “meta-regime” of this general type is collective bargaining, or some close social partnership or neo-corporatist analogue. The expectation is that, in return for a secure place in the constitutional order, labor and capital will bargain to achieve public-regarding outcomes. But for decades now such arrangements have failed because of some combination of inability to adjust to uncertain and diverse conditions and self-dealing by
incumbents at the expense of outsiders. To address both failings, we found
the meta-regime on governance principles subjecting all decisions to con­
tinuing mutual scrutiny by stakeholders under public oversight. These in­
novative modes of governance, we argue further, allow the parties, beginning
with only a thin understanding of the substance and scope of their goals, to
assess one another’s capacities and good faith in the very process of refining
ideas of what the eventual project should be. Trust and coalition building—
the preconditions for meta-regimes built on social partnership—are the out­
come of joint problem solving under this governance. The good jobs strategy
can only succeed in the end with the support of a wide and robust coalition.
We argue that building consensus through problem solving helps ensure that
mobilization is put to effective use.

“Good Jobs” as a Source of Positive Externality

THE SOURCES OF THE EXTERNALITY

Producing good jobs is a source of positive externality for society. From an
economic standpoint, the issues are analogous to those that arise in the cases
of environmental externalities or research and development (R&D) external­
ities, two domains on which we will draw when we develop our organiza­
tional recommendations.

A firm considers labor as a production input, with the market wage as its
cost. In the short run, the wage rate determines the firm’s desired level of
employment. In the medium run, it also determines the kind of technologies
the firm invests in and the production technique—the mix between labor
and various forms of capital. When wages rise, either because of greater pro­
ductivity or enhanced bargaining power of labor, firms try to economize on
the use of labor and adopt technologies that replace workers. From society’s
standpoint, the result is an undesirable trade-off between good jobs and the
level of employment. Today’s economies tend to manage this trade-off by
allowing dualistic labor markets to become entrenched (Temin 2017): islands
of productive, high-wage activities exist in a sea of poor jobs. Labor market
and social policies generally determine the distance between working condi­
tions in the two sectors. But a higher floor on economy-wide wages generally
comes at the expense of higher unemployment and lower labor hours.

Some version of this trade-off has existed throughout history. In grow­
ing economies, the tension is typically alleviated by an economy-wide rise in
productivity, which suppresses the distinction between insider and outsider
jobs. For example, the mechanization of agriculture during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries created a surplus of labor in the countryside. But the workers who flooded into urban centers could be absorbed into manufacturing activities (and related services) where productivity and wages were even higher. De-industrialization during the second half of the twentieth century led to a similar but more challenging dilemma. Rapid labor productivity growth in manufacturing (and import competition) resulted in a loss of production jobs and a shift to employment in services, where wages and employment conditions were often inferior. Today’s technological trends—automation, the knowledge economy, digital technologies—are leading to a significant exacerbation of the problem. The productivity effects of these new technologies remain bottled in a limited number of sectors and metropolitan locations, generating relatively small numbers of good jobs, while the rest of the economy remains stagnant (Remes et al., 2018). “Where will the good jobs come from?” is perhaps the defining question of our contemporary political economy.

We do not view this simply as a problem of inequality and exclusion, but also as a problem of gross economic inefficiency—a case of operating deep inside the production possibility frontier, or in other economic terms, positive and negative externalities.

The central distinction in an externality is between private and social costs. When private costs of production of, say, a polluting firm do not take account of the costs to society of pollution, the result is a negative externality. When the social benefits of, say, a location decision exceed the gains to the investing firm, the externality is positive. Communities where middle-class jobs have gone scarce suffer from a variety of social ailments. Bad jobs, by undermining the social structures that underpin economic prosperity, create enormous negative externalities.¹

In his pathbreaking book *When Work Disappears*, sociologist William Julius Wilson (1996) described at length the social costs of the decline in the number manufacturing and blue-collar jobs, ranging from broken families to drug abuse and crime. While Wilson’s focus was on racial minorities living in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods, his argument applies more broadly. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2019) studied communities across the entire US, differentiating them by the degree to which they were affected by import competition with China. Communities where jobs came under greatest pressure from Chinese imports experienced an increase in “idleness” among young males (the state of being neither employed nor in school) and a rise in male mortality because of drug and alcohol abuse, HIV/AIDS, and homicide. Job loss also led to an increase in the fraction of unwed mothers, of children in single-headed households, and of children living in poverty.
These economic and social impacts of good jobs going scarce are compounded by the political consequences. There is by now considerable evidence from a number of advanced market economies that links the rise of nativist populist political movements to adverse labor market developments. In the United States, the China trade shock had a significant impact on political polarization (Autor et al. 2017). Holding constant initial political conditions in 2002, districts that experienced sharper increases in import competition were less likely to elect a “moderate” legislator in 2010. New legislators elected in hardest hit areas tend to occupy more extreme positions on the ideological spectrum, especially on the right. Districts initially in Republican hands were substantially more likely to elect a GOP conservative. What is perhaps the most intriguing implication of this research is that the labor market disruptions stemming from the China trade shock may have been directly responsible for Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 2016. Autor et al. (2017) undertake a counterfactual analysis in which they assume the growth of Chinese import penetration is 50 percent lower than the realized rate over the 2002–2014 period. Their estimates on the electoral consequences indicate that a Democrat instead of a Republican presidential candidate would have been elected in 2016 in the swing states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. The Democratic candidate would also have obtained an overall majority in the Electoral College under this counterfactual scenario.

Another paper on Sweden traces out very similar political consequences, even though the shocks that led to labor market disruption were of a different nature (Dal Bò et al., 2018). A series of reforms after 2006 under a conservative-led coalition reduced social insurance and transfer benefits while lowering taxes, increasing the disposable income gap between “insiders” and “outsiders”—those with steady jobs and those who were either unemployed or relied on temporary jobs. The post-2008 financial crisis and recession helped widen the gap. The main beneficiary appears to have been the right-wing, anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats party. The authors show that the local insider-outsider income gaps and the share of vulnerable insiders are positively correlated with larger electoral gains by the Sweden Democrats. Exposure to immigrants, on the other hand, is not systematically associated with support for the political right. The fundamental cause of nativist politics seems to be decline in secure, good jobs rather than cultural or xenophobic preferences per se.

Similar results have been reported for other European countries. Analyzing the political realignment behind Brexit, Colantone and Stanig (2016) attribute a key role to the labor market impact of globalization. Using a China trade shock variable, similar to Autor et al., they show regions with larger im-
port penetration from China had a higher Leave vote share. They corroborate this finding with individual-level data from the British Election Survey that shows individuals in regions more affected by the import shock were more likely to vote for Leave, conditional on education and other characteristics. A second paper by Colantone and Stanig (2017) undertakes a parallel analysis for 15 European countries over the 1988–2007 period, finding that the China trade shock played a statistically (and quantitatively) significant role across regions and at the individual level. A larger import shock was associated with support for nationalist parties and a shift toward radical right-wing parties. Guiso et al. (2017) look at European survey data on individual voting behavior and find an important role for economic insecurity—including exposure to competition from imports and immigrants—in driving populist parties’ growth. Individuals who experience greater economic insecurity were also less likely to show up at the polls.

Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the political consequences of adverse labor market shocks is that such shocks weaken support for democracy and foster authoritarian attitudes. The association between economic crisis and the rise of fascism in interwar Europe is well known (Frieden 2006). More broadly, economic stagnation or decline among the middle classes undermines the set of moral values and beliefs that sustain liberal democracy (Friedman 2005). There is evidence from our current moment in history that some of the same tendencies are at play. In the United States, individuals located in local labor markets that were more substantially affected by imports from China appear to have developed more authoritarian values (Ballard-Rosa, Jensen, and Scheve 2018). Similarly, individuals living in European regions that received more negative globalization shocks were systematically less supportive of democracy and liberal values and more in favor of authoritarian leaders (Colantone and Stanig 2018).

In short, there are significant economic, social, and political costs of failure to generate good jobs. Bad jobs lead to lagging communities with poor social outcomes (health, education, crime) and social and political strife (populist backlash, democratic malfunction). A private employer fails to take these costs into account, unless prompted to do by the state. The empirical literature suggests that these negative externalities are substantial—perhaps so great that they threaten the economic order underpinning our form of government. Good jobs, conversely, have enormous positive externalities.

Our focus on the social externality of good jobs is a key difference from approaches that revolve around firm-level practices. For example, in her well-known book *The Good Jobs Strategy*, Zeynep Ton advocates a range of employment policies such as higher wages and benefits that she argues could help
employers as well as employees. The argument, nicely encapsulated in her subtitle, is that smart companies can boost profits by investing in their employees. We do not deny that such opportunities exist, and that firms may do well by doing good for their workers. But as Osterman (2018) emphasizes in a review, the evidence that profit-maximizing firms can benefit from "high road" employment practices is limited and far from overwhelming. The vast majority of firms may not be inclined to offer or expand good jobs unless the strategy is part of a concerted collaboration with public agencies in which they are offered something in return. That something could be either carrots in the form of tailored public services or the withholding of a stick in the form of tax easements. Put starkly, creating good jobs under current circumstances makes good sense for society as a whole, but not for many firms. Given the enormous costs of bad jobs, closing this gap seems almost self-evidently an urgent political task.

THE INADEQUACY OF STANDARD REMEDIES

Having established that good jobs are a source of positive externalities, we now explore why the standard remedies are inadequate. The conventional instrument for internalizing an externality is a Pigovian subsidy, which would be a generalized employment subsidy in this case. But successful administration of Pigovian subsidies requires sufficient information about the size of the externality and (what often amounts to the same thing) a relatively static environment. In a dynamic environment with substantial uncertainty, alternative regulatory arrangements are often preferable.

In a classic article, Weitzman (1974) showed that quantity targets may dominate price instruments (such as a subsidy) under such conditions. A price instrument (subsidy) minimizes the costs of achieving a certain target, at the risk of missing the target (because of uncertainty about supply and demand responses, say). Quantitative targets, on the other hand, achieve the requisite social outcome but potentially at greater economic cost than is necessary. When the risks of just missing the socially optimal target—making water drinkable, say—outweigh the risks of inadvertently imposing too high a cleanup cost on producers, quantity targets are preferable to Pigovian price instruments. The analogous argument in the present context is that the risk of failing to generate a sufficient number of good jobs in a particular community may dwarf the risk of imposing too high a burden on individual firms.

Uncertainty also increases the dimensionality of the policy space. In the standard conception of externalities, there is a single quantity, with an associated market price, that is responsible for the generation of the external-
The appropriate intervention consists of directly targeting that price (or quantity) and doing no more than that. But when there is uncertainty about behavior, technology, and the effectiveness of different policies, optimal policies—in the second-best sense of the term—will range over multiple margins of intervention and several different types of policy instruments. Learning about what works and what does not becomes an integral part of the policy process. Establishing mechanisms of feedback from firms to public authorities is critical to the regulatory apparatus. The relevant policy space is of much higher dimensionality.

Finally, an additional problem with standard regulatory remedies in the present setting is that they postulate clear goals ("objective functions," in economics jargon). As uncertainty increases, it becomes difficult to specify in advance not only the costs and benefits of regulation, but also its precise objectives. The government and its agencies will often have to go further and "negotiate" improvement targets with individual firms or clusters of firms. What is a good job, how many can be reasonably created, how do technological and other firm-level choices influence job creation, what are the complementary policy levers that are available, how can that set of instruments be expanded—these are necessarily local, contextual questions. They can be answered, and periodically revised, only through a customized, iterative process of strategic interaction between public agencies and private firms. This process is alien to the familiar, principal-agent framework of rulemaking, which assumes that goals and social benefits must be known in advance if public action is to be effective and accountable. But it is the hallmark of the new type of regulation to which we turn next.

### Key Features of Regulation under Extreme Uncertainty

Consider first contracting under uncertainty between private parties (which as we will see in a moment closely approximates the ARPA case). Under stable conditions, each party can specify precisely what it expects in exchange with the other—*do ut des*. Precision, moreover, is often unnecessary, because in stable circumstances the same parties often contract repeatedly with each other, and these relations give rise to shared norms and expectations that guide performance even when there are gaps and ambiguities in formal agreements.

But under uncertainty, the very trajectory of technology is unforeseeable and solutions in any domain are often found by applying ideas that arise far afield. It is neither possible to specify obligations in advance nor to rely on shared norms as supplements or substitutes for detailed agreements. Operat-
ing at the edge of established solutions, neither party can say exactly what is feasible, let alone what the other should contribute to the joint effort. When solutions are in view, they will often involve collaboration not with familiar partners but with strangers, with norms and expectations of their own.

Under these circumstances, the nature of the contract itself changes. Instead of defining precisely each party’s obligations, the agreement establishes broad goals and a regime for evaluating achievement of them. As observed in domains as diverse as biotechnology, information technology (IT), and advanced manufacturing, this regime establishes regular, joint reviews of progress toward interim targets or milestones, procedures for deciding whether and with what exact aim to proceed or not, and mechanisms for resolving disagreements. The information exchanged under such a regime allows the parties to develop a more and more precise idea of the shared goal while allowing each to assess with increasing reliability the capacities and good faith of the other: to observe if the capable stranger can become a reliable partner and the long-trusted partner is capable of innovative tasks. As collaboration progresses, each party comes to rely increasingly on the capacities of the other, deterring opportunistic defection and generating or activating norms of reciprocity. Joint regular review and deliberate consideration of the interim results thus create the conditions in which informal norms and self-interested calculations bind the parties to continue promising collaboration in good faith. Trust and mutual reliance are the result of agreement to collaborate, not its precondition, just as the precise aims of cooperation are the outcome, not the starting point of joint efforts (Gilson, Sabel, and Scott 2009).

Regulation under extreme uncertainty arrives at a closely related solution from a somewhat different starting point. Under stable conditions, mitigation of externalities is mandated by legislation and given precise form in consultation between the regulator and the regulated parties (subject to judicial review in case of continuing, insistent disagreement). The costs of mitigation are known to the regulated party but not (or at least not easily) to the regulator. Addressees of regulation try to use this information asymmetry to minimize their costs of adjustment while regulators devise ways of eliciting serviceable cost information without being captured by the actors that provide it. The upshot is a fixed set of limits on permissible behavior and a schedule of fines for exceeding them.

Under uncertainty, neither the regulator nor the regulated parties have reliable information on the possibilities and costs of adjustment in the medium term, and only conjectures regarding the possibilities that will open—or not—upon further investigation. Again the response—seen in food safety, civil aviation, and pharmaceuticals, among many other industries—is the cre-
Building a Good Jobs Economy

Typically the regulator, acting as before under a legislative mandate and after extensive consultations, establishes an ambitious, open-ended outcome: for example, "good water," as measured by minimal deviation from the pristine state of a particular type of body of water such as an alpine stream or Mediterranean river, or a dramatic reduction over an extended period in vehicular emissions from various sources. The regulated entities—private parties, states, or member states and their subdivisions in the US or the EU—are obligated to make plans to achieve the goals and to regularly report their results. Penalties in this regime are not calculated to deter infraction of clear rules but rather to incentivize cooperative production of the information from which standards will eventually be derived. Thus penalties are imposed as a rule only for failure to report or to report honestly, or for persistent failure to achieve results whose feasibility is demonstrated by the attainments of others in like positions; though infrequent, those penalties can be dauntingly severe, often amounting to exclusion from the market or (for public addressees) severe limits on decision-making autonomy. In contract law, such information-forcing sanctions are often called penalty defaults, and we adopt that term here.

The combination of ambitious and open-ended goals, planning obligations, and the threat of potentially draconian penalties for obstinately uncooperative behavior encourages investigation of new possibilities, including contextualized variants of general solutions and collaboration among regulated parties and between them as a group and the regulator. As long as some actors are looking to set new standards though their innovations—creating markets for innovative technology they develop, or simply putting competitors under pressure to match their performance—others will be less willing to cling to the status quo at the risk of being caught out when methods advance. In an environment where the development of technology is uncertain precisely because of the continually surprising abundance of opportunities it affords, the expansive search for innovation is likely to feed on itself, with inquiry generating more inquiry, if only to minimize the chances of being surprised by developments. Search is likely to be collaborative either because projects are interdisciplinary and require the combined efforts of different specialists or because any one approach, interdisciplinary or not, is likely to fail and many actors will consider it prudent to pool the risks of exploration through various forms of collaboration.

Taken together, many concurrent searches will yield a stream of surprises, unsettling the understanding of what is technically possible and raising questions about what regulation can and should reasonably require. "Notice
and comment”—the one-time consultation of stakeholders required in rulemaking by regulatory agencies in the US—gives way to regular, organized exchanges as regulators and addressees seek to establish common expectation in the face of rapidly evolving knowledge. Mutual ignorance and fear of surprises further bolsters information sharing between public and private actors. By making it risky to bet on the status quo and potentially rewarding to try to surpass it, this regulatory regime turns uncertainty itself from an obstacle to demanding standards into a spur to collective learning that shows, cumulatively, how to realize them.

The Environmental and R&D Analogues

There are two successful examples of regulation—understood in the broad sense of public measures addressing externalities—under dynamic and uncertain conditions. The first is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and its offspring, the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E). They respond to the characteristic learning externalities that arise at the far frontier of science and technology, where for now there may well be no solution at all to a particular problem, and the search for one will likely end in costly disappointment. Worse still for the private investor, even when the search is successful it is unlikely that the daring pioneer can appropriate the returns from the discovery. The predictable result is underinvestment, from the standpoint of society as a whole, in research and technology. The second example is regulation by the EU and Ireland of Irish water quality and the Irish dairy industry generally. This case illustrates the distinctive difficulties associated with mitigation of environmental externalities. Even when solutions can be developed in principle, it is difficult to estimate the costs of applying them, especially since, to be effective, general measures must be adapted to highly differentiated local circumstances. The familiar result is regulation that, for fear of imposing intolerable burdens on regulated parties, is often too timid to be effective, or when resolute, regulation that is ineffective for failure to take account of local particularity. Neither case is perfectly congruent to the “good jobs” challenge. But the success of both is due to the emergence of common mechanisms of governance under uncertainty that, we argue, can make the good jobs strategy workable and accountable.

DARPA AND ARPA-E

In discussions of industrial policy, DARPA, created in 1958 in response to the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, is often and usefully invoked as
a reminder that the knowledge economy was not created solely by private actors—entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and technologists—responding only to opportunities signaled by markets. Far from being a mere bystander, the state, acting through DARPA and related agencies, played—and continues to play—a fundamental role in organizing the research from which are hewn the building blocks of the information economy. Among its iconic contributions are the computer network protocols underlying the Internet, precursors to the global positioning systems, and fundamental tools and devices for microprocessor design and fabrication. The accomplishments of DARPA have inspired a number of research agencies on similar lines, of which ARPA-E—a program created in the wake of the financial crisis to foster innovation in the energy sector—is both the most successful and the most faithful to the procedures of the original model.

Recent studies of ARPA-E examine in detail the institutional mechanisms by which such public entities can orient, coordinate, and discipline collaborative investigation at the outer edge of technical possibility. If those mechanisms are today commonplace or rapidly becoming so, it is not because DARPA's methods are widely emulated but rather because more and more organizations, public and private, are adapting to the high-uncertainty environment, once exotic, that shaped DARPA from the first.

ARPA-E's overarching goal in establishing programs is to eliminate “white spaces” in the landscape of technical knowledge: missing capabilities, just beyond the frontier of current technical possibility, which, if mastered, would clear the way for advances in an important domain. A program might, for example, aim to support the investigation of novel battery concepts with the potential to reduce storage costs by enough to make an environmentally attractive class of electricity grid designs economically feasible. At every stage in the organization of research—the definition of programs of investigation, the selection of a portfolio of projects advancing the program purpose, and the supervision of individual projects in the portfolio—ARPA-E treats goals as provisional, or corrigible in the light of experience. As with the contracts among innovating parties discussed above, precise goals are the result of a search, not fixed from the first.

ARPA-E's program directors (PDs) play a key role in the collaborative setting and revision of goals. PDs are hired largely on the basis of their promise in giving direction to an emergent area of investigation. For instance, a candidate with a background in geology will be hired to create a program in advanced geothermal energy. Once program goals have been framed, the PD does a "deep dive." PDs and ARPA-E technical staff supplement and correct their own background experience with reviews of the scientific literature,
site visits to universities and companies, commissioned external studies, and consultation with Department of Energy (DOE) research managers. PDs then test the practicality of the emerging research area in technical workshops involving leading engineering, scientific, and commercial experts. If the research plan (adjusted to reflect the exchanges at the workshop) passes review, a project is formally created as a component of the developing program.

Proposals for research within the projects are developed and executed in the same manner, with goals open to recurrent challenge and revision. Applicants first submit a concept paper: a short document explaining why the proposal is superior to alternative approaches and how it responds to foreseeable technical and commercial risks. Proposals that survive a first round of external review are developed into full applications and reviewed again, with the difference that applicants may rebut criticism by external reviewers. The winners, designated “research partners” or “performers,” then negotiate project milestones with agency staff.

The execution of the project is subject, in the argot of ARPA-E, to “active project management,” a process with a strong family resemblance to the information-generating regime in contracting for innovation. Its most conspicuous feature is the quarterly progress report that research partners must provide for review by PDs and agency staff. Missed milestones can touch off an intensification of site visits, conference calls, meetings, and written analysis of problems and possible solutions. When projects struggle, milestones can be reset to permit an alternative to the failed approach. Milestones are added or deleted in fully 45 percent of the projects, not counting substantive modifications, which are said to be frequent. If recovery efforts fail, the PD sends an “at risk” letter warning of the possibility of termination. In short, the agency rejects the model of hands-off, bet-on-the-person-not-the-project administration preferred by many established and successful research funders, public and private, in favor of the continuous, collaborative review and adjustment adopted in biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, and venture capital.

ARPA-E is too new to permit any evaluation of its long-term impact. The energy industry—where even demonstration projects require substantial investment, innovators immediately confront legacy providers, and regulation is more likely to constrain innovation than, as in pharmaceuticals, accommodate it—changes so gradually that large transformations only slowly become visible. But the available evidence does strongly suggest that ARPA-E is indeed choosing projects in the zone of uncertainty—where the positive externalities of research and development will be especially large—and using its information-generating regime effectively to make the most of its choices.
Expert disagreement about what is possible is a good working definition of uncertainty. If ARPA-E funds uncertain projects, it should select projects whose prospects the best experts—its reviewers—disagree on. This is what we observe. There is a very slight correlation between reviewers’ ratings of projects and the likelihood that they will be funded. Selection is not based on a consensus view of project prospects. Perhaps more tellingly, holding the rating constant, the agency picks the project where the range of reviewer rankings is the greatest—where judgments diverge the most. Plainly, the PDs and the selection committee are relying on other information—rebuttals, observation of the research in workshop dialogue with peers, and much else besides.

Project selection and governance, moreover, do not seem to favor either scientifically oriented projects doing basic research validated in journal publications or commercially oriented projects doing applied research validated by patents or market engagement. Compared to projects in other branches of the DOE doing either basic or applied research, ARPA-E projects have a higher rate of patenting and the same high rate of publishing. Most strikingly, they are more likely than the specialized projects to produce both a publication and patent (Goldstein and Narayanamurti 2018). A plausible interpretation is that they combine practical invention with scientific discovery on the model of use-inspired basic research made famous by Pasteur. As we will see next, commercial constraints and the penalty defaults imposed by EU environment law have made use-inspired research on similar lines central to the regulation of the water quality in Ireland and its dairy industry generally.

**IRISH DAIRY FARMING**

Regulation, and especially environmental regulation, differs from ARPA-E’s contractual governance of research in two ways. First, agreements between the agency and award recipients are fully consensual (i.e., candidates compete for awards). Many addressees of regulation prefer no public constraints on their behavior; some even actively resist the imposition of rules. Penalty defaults therefore play an important role in inducing cooperation with the regulator, but none in the formation of award agreements. Second, ARPA-E faces the uncertainty that arises from manifest limits of our knowledge of science and technology: the “white spaces” mark the places where we do not know the laws of nature that apply to a particular problem. Environmental regulation encounters such frontier uncertainty as well, only it is often challenged instead or in addition by uncertainties arising from the singularities.
of place: the way known factors—familiar pollutant streams, types of subsoil and geology, for instance—combine in particular contexts to produce unforeseeable results. “White spaces” get filled in once and for all. Once we learn the electrochemistry of cutting energy storage costs by a certain amount, that problem is solved. But environmental problems typically have to be redefined and addressed place by place: they are more often white dots rather than white spaces, and filling in one is of limited or no help in filling in an adjacent one. In this regard, environmental regulation strongly resembles and can serve as a partial model for regulation of the “good jobs” externality. In both cases, a central task of governance is creating an information-exchange regime that induces the local actors to cooperate to contextualize solutions while enabling them to benefit from the pooled experience of others, and vice versa.

Within environmental regulation, nonpoint source pollution is the paradigmatic case of contextual uncertainty. The regular emissions of large polluters, such as power plants or sewage treatment facilities, are (relatively) easy to detect and control. Intermittent emissions from diffuse sources, such as the runoff from sporadic detergent use in scattered households, are not. Agricultural runoff is especially refractory because of the great variation in the pitch and absorptive capacity from field to field, the stark seasonal variations in weather and the rapid changes in the level and nature of productive activity induced by cycles of cultivation. We look to advances in the regulation of water pollution in agriculture to refine ideas about the governance of contextualization of the good jobs strategy, and to Ireland in particular, where pressures to reconcile demanding legal requirements to limit pollution with the needs of an expanding dairy industry have produced both an especially sharp understanding of the problem of contextual uncertainty and innovative reforms to address it.

The conviction that environmentally sustainable dairying could be a modern engine of growth came late to Ireland. Through much of the twentieth century, Irish dairy farming was dominated by extremely small holdings, with limited export opportunities and relatively low productivity and incomes. Membership in the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the EU) and its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) together with imposition of EU milk quotas prompted consolidation, yielding a smaller but more efficient and capable cohort of specialized dairy farms that are still small—measured by farm acreage and herd size—in comparison to industrial producers. The Irish co-ops also consolidated and became first-tier suppliers of ingredients to global consumer food firms. Ireland—which accounts for less than 1 percent of global milk output (Eurostat 2017; FAO 2018, 5)—supplies
almost 10 percent of the world's infant formula market and exports 90 percent of its dairy output.

Grass is the source of the competitiveness of Irish dairy. The larger representative Irish dairy farm has the lowest cash cost-to-output ratio of the key international milk-producing regions, including the US, New Zealand, and Australia (Thorne et al. 2017, 70). Homegrown, grass-feed is much cheaper than purchased-feed concentrates; its price is relatively stable, sheltering Irish dairy farmers against a substantial risk. Cows that pasture on grass produce milk solids of superior quality; the grazing cow is, for watchful consumers in many parts of the world, the emblem of food production at its most natural.

For all these reasons the Irish dairy sector and its counterparts in various government departments have, since the turn of this century, come to see the national system of grass-based dairying on family farms as a model of production with a bright future and a central role in the overall development of the country—provided it can reconcile increasing efficiency with regulatory and consumer demands for environmental sustainability.

EU law compelled Ireland to respond, haltingly and reluctantly, to agricultural pollution long before farmers, farm organizations, dairy co-ops, and the state extension service—Teagasc—became active advocates of sustainability. The Nitrates Directive of 1991 sets out precise concentration limits. Farms that fail to comply can be fined or disqualified from the EU single farm payment. Countries that fail to meet national limits must submit a plan for improvement to secure a temporary derogation of requirements or face potential draconian sanctions typical of penalty defaults.

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000 has, in contrast, extremely broad objectives: “good water” is defined for each type of water body (such as alpine streams or freshwater lakes) as minimal deviation from the chemical values and distribution and quantity of life forms associated with a pristine body of water of that type (Poikane et al. 2014). The basic unit of management is the river basin or catchment: the contiguous territory that drains into the sea at a single river mouth, estuary, or delta. Member states produce a six-year River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) for each basin using a collaborative process in which public officials, experts, and stakeholders specify objectives as well as procedures for translating them into concrete activities. Until 2027, counties that fall short can submit a new RBMP at the end of each planning cycle by asserting that the earlier approach proved technically infeasible or disproportionately expensive. Thereafter, as a penalty default, cost and feasibility will not excuse noncompliance.

Implementation of both directives has proved frustratingly difficult. Ad-
herence to “good practices” in agriculture has often failed to produce improvements in nitrate levels; effective, inclusive participation of local actors in the definition and continuing revision of the intentionally open-ended goals has been a major stumbling block in the application of the WFD. RBMPs, however made, have not achieved their objectives. Many member states will fail to meet the 2027 deadline. The directive was to be revised in 2019, but the revision postponed, among other reasons to reset the penalty default. 10

In Ireland, compliance failures triggered a series of research programs to improve understanding and control of pollution flows at the catchment and field levels. These programs, linked with similar ones in other member states, have helped generate a web of institutions that is coming to function as an integrated system of local governance of water quality, greatly expanding public participation in environmental decision-making in the process. In Teagasc’s Agricultural Catchments Programme (ACP) of 2008, for example, six catchment areas, differing in soil types, geology, and types of farming, were selected to study the relations among farm management practices, flows of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorous, and the resulting changes in water quality. The ACP’s key finding is that variations in soil and subsoil types and the underlying geology are in combination so influential in the absorption and drainage of nutrients that general rules of nutrient management, let alone plans based on them, will regularly fail. Poorly drained fields with environmentally innocuous phosphorus values may still pollute because of fast surface runoff while well-drained soils with alarming phosphorus concentrations may not pollute at all (Shortle and Jordan 2017, 17). The policy implication is that a nutrient management plan should be a starting point or provisional guide for joint investigation, by farmers and extension advisers, of environmental risks and how most economically to address them.

This kind of catchment program is part of a larger effort by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its partner institutions in water quality management to establish a cascading process of national, regional, and local consultation to select areas for intervention and to ensure full and effective participation of the affected local actors in the execution of projects that concern them. The selection process and new governance institutions come together in “local catchment assessments”: field-level examinations by the local actors themselves of the source of pollution in water bodies identified as intervention priorities. This assessment determines the local work plan, specifying and prioritizing projects. Agricultural problems detected by field assessments are referred to specialist sustainability advisers who assist the
implicated farmers to improve their nutrient management practices," linking contextualization of pollution mitigation measures on the farm to contextualization of water management at the catchment or territorial level.

We draw three lessons for the design of the good jobs strategy from the Irish and EU experience with environmental regulation of contextual uncertainty. First, while framework legislation (the WFD) and penalty defaults orient and incentivize the creation of new governance instruments for local adaptation of general policies, making those institutions actually work requires continuing revision of initial plans in light of—frequently disappointing—experience. The recent flurry of institution building in Irish water regulation is the culmination of systematic investigation and hard experience, punctuated by false starts and half measures. There are principles of design for these institutions, but no blueprints.

Chief among these principles—the second lesson—is that contextualization in the sense of recognition of the need for local solutions to idiosyncratic local problems is a corrective and supplement to higher-level decision-making and procedures, but not a substitute for them. Local catchment assessments modify the specifications of targets identified by national and regional review and the order in which they are approached. Local authorities and stakeholders are not free to disregard the national list of priorities. Lower levels correct higher levels and vice versa. We can think of contextualization of this kind as a variant of the reciprocal review of collaborators we encountered in contracting for innovation.

Finally, contextualization blurs the distinction between regulation, directed to ensure compliance with rules—order maintenance within a given system—and the creation of new institutional systems. Contextualization induces collaboration between regulators, other public officials, and regulated entities in the development of novel forms of capacity building and public participation in regulatory decision-making. Irish dairy farmers in the catchment projects prepare their nutrient management plans with the support of specialist extension agents, who consult with catchment specialists; farmers with environmental problems collaborate with newly formed catchment assessment teams, connected in turn to a new corps of specialist sustainability advisers. Traditional extension agents propagate consolidated expertise. In codeveloping improvement plans with individual farmers and each other, these new specialists are reconsidering and revising current understandings as much as applying them. Collaborative investigation is necessary precisely because current rules and best practices run out, and establishing what should be done goes hand in hand with understanding and building the capacity needed to do it. When we speak, as we do next,
of regulation in relation to the good jobs strategy we mean the term in this enlarged sense of fixing (and revising) requirements and inducing the creation of novel institutions, with all their further spillovers, that enable the addressees of regulation to meet them.

**Applying the Model to Good Jobs**

The concept of “good jobs,” like clean water, is imprecise and needs to be operationalized in a way that is both evolving and context-dependent. Reasonable, attainable targets for the creation of good jobs must remain provisional, to be revised under new information. We can think of them as rebuttable presumptions, mandating behavior except when there is compelling evidence that they demand the impossible or do not demand enough. Achieving the targets depends on decisions on investment, technological choice, and business organization, the consequences of which are unknowable ex ante. Governance under uncertainty takes as its starting point the provisionality of ends and means and the need for disciplined review and revision. Here we sketch what the model would look like when applied to the challenge of creating good jobs through public-private collaboration. We stress similarities, but also some differences.

Simplifying greatly, the uncertainty government agencies face in the ARPA-E case is principally about technological feasibility. The uncertainty in the dairy case derives largely from local adaptation. A “good jobs” program faces uncertainties of both kinds. Creating or preserving good jobs in a particular place often depends partly on extending technological capabilities: mastering techniques that are wholly novel (at least in some particular application) or so new to a given locale that they must almost be reinvented to be mastered. Here ARPA-E’s experience with active project management and collaborative review and adjustment of milestones is directly relevant. But fostering good jobs depends at least as much on solving highly idiosyncratic, place-specific problems: failures of coordination between local firms and training institutions and between firms and their (potential) supply-chain partners, and the managerial breakdowns or skill gaps within individual firms and institutions to which the coordination problems point. Here the peer assessment of local problems and new forms of collaboration with networks of extension experts developed in Irish pollution control come into their own. There are many ways to imagine integrating or coordinating the operation of the two variants of the governance model in particular conditions; how precisely is a practical question, to be answered in context when
the time comes, and provisionally—subject to correction—in accord with the precepts of the governance model itself.

An immediate question has to do with the timing, scale, and scope of the obligations (and penalty defaults) to be imposed on private firms. If there is a genuine good jobs externality, and a national or subnational mandate to address it, there is no reason, in principle, that the obligation to do so should not be applied immediately to all firms in the relevant jurisdiction. But as just noted, those obligations are inherently broad, open-ended, and at least initially, ill-defined. They would begin with the requirement to make plans to progress toward forms of organization and deployment of technology that in combination produce better jobs, and to make such plans in coordination with relevant peers and institutional partners. But this may well be a too draconian first step. Unless we assume extraordinary consensus in favor of addressing the jobs externality or a dangerously coercive state authority, we cannot really imagine the regulator imposing on all firms, or even all firms in certain sectors, the obligation to make such plans; and if we cannot imagine that, still less can we envisage penalty defaults for persistent failure to make good faith efforts to comply.

It is easier to imagine imposing such requirements and penalties on actors who volunteer to participate in government programs designed to achieve the same outcome and conferring benefits in the form of improved regulation, better coordination, extensive customized support services, or the like in return for participation. The framework goals, continuous monitoring and reporting requirements, and penalty defaults (in the form of exclusion) would apply in this setting, but they would be the mutually agreed, common governance mechanism of a whole portfolio of industrial policy measures addressing the good jobs externality. The voluntary and selective nature of the partnership with state agencies suggests that this start-up phase of the good jobs strategy could make use of ARPA-E’s governance of program definition—proceeding incrementally and repeatedly exposing designs to objections and alternatives—and active project monitoring.

A key benefit of these voluntary arrangements over the medium term is to develop an inventory of “good practices”—a repertoire of contextualization measures variously suited to a wide range of settings—that can eventually guide application of the good jobs strategy to a larger set of firms, cutting the costs and increasingly the chances for early successes of broader coverage. Put differently, the initial, selective projects would serve as a pilot program for the new system of regulation, with the qualification that pilots are usually understood as practical tests of promising concepts, whereas in this
case their purpose would be more to identify and begin to refine promising approaches under real-world conditions than subject them to definitive tests. As formal obligations are extended, the arrangements would come to resemble the European regulatory model, with a uniform requirement of participation but responses highly differentiated by locale. The need for contextualized support for the less capable actors drawn into the system would grow apace.

An intermediate arrangement might also be possible. Firms might be asked to make a choice between participation in customized compacts for good jobs with public agencies and submitting to a fixed regulatory regime that imposes a common, universal set of benefits and obligations linked to job creation: for example, a schedule of tax incentives/penalties in return for an increase of $x$ percent per annum in the number of employees at wages at or above $y$ percent of the local median, where the rate of job creation may be tied to the business cycle. Firms would then self-select into their preferred regime, providing information, by their choices, about the relative effectiveness of the alternatives and, in time, suggesting revisions to them.

With these design principles and staging practicalities in mind, an industrial policy on good jobs could be introduced in four steps. First the government commits in legislation or by other means to address the problem of bad jobs and no jobs as a constitutional externality that threatens the foundations of our democracy and requires for its solution concerted cooperation between regulators, service providers, and private actors. The framing legislation mandates regulators with relevant authority to put in place information-generating regimes that allow for standard setting and revision. The same legislation creates an interagency body to periodically review and prompt improvement of regulatory responses, and to resolve coordination problems arising from them, while also providing funds and authority for voluntary programs in anticipation of an eventual, step-wise extension of regulatory reach.

Regulators who currently have delegated authority for areas directly affecting job abundance and quality—vocation training, agricultural and manufacturing extension, standard setting, and the like—introduce, in a second step, innovation-inducing and contextualizing governance mechanisms where they are not already in place, anticipating the need for support services to help vulnerable actors comply with increasingly demanding requirements. The requirements can take different forms, including specific employment quantity targets and/or standards.

Where current regulatory authority does not reach, the government creates volunteer, public-private programs to advance the frontiers of technol-
ogy and organization, or—and of equal and perhaps greater importance—provide support services and perhaps subsidies to help firms bridge the gap between their current low-productivity/low-skill position and participation in the advanced sector. These programs, in their ensemble, would have to combine services to workers as well as managers; they would have to be customized to the needs of particular sectors and locales, and probably both. They would adhere to the design principles of innovation-inducing governance; their performance would be accordingly reviewed and their goals adjusted by the responsible agency and then, if problems persist, the interagency body.

Finally, conditional on the success of voluntary arrangements, the scope of these practices would gradually be made obligatory for nonparticipating firms, starting with requirements for submitting credible plans for improving the quality and quantity of jobs they offer, along with their competitive position, by better organization and use of skill and technology. Where appropriate, plans should anticipate coordination with other firms and institutions. Penalty defaults would be imposed on laggard firms that, despite the availability of support services, persistently fail to comply.

To place our proposed framework in sharper relief, we discuss briefly how it relates to some existing initiatives for promoting manufacturing and job creation.

COMPARISON WITH CURRENT INITIATIVES

Of the three major components of the building good jobs program—extension services and cooperative research programs for existing firms; job creation and attraction policies; and active labor market policies or workforce development—it is to the last, workforce development, that the governance practices in advanced technology and European regulation (described previously) have been most consistently applied with demonstrable success. In the case of job attraction, the experience has been nearly the reverse. Local and state politicians outbid each other to win outside investments in new facilities, more often than not in deals that (in contrast to contracts for innovation) specify all terms of the exchange fully in advance: so much in subsidies for each job created at an agreed wage rate in a facility of an agreed type. Though there are important exceptions in conspicuous, recent cases, local learning is scarcely an afterthought. Extension services and cooperative research programs are an intermediate case, with successive waves of institutional innovation leaving the policy landscape dotted with small organizations that appear to do some good in their ambits but in their isolation do
not much affect the course of development (Block, Keller, and Negoita 2018; Deloitte 2017). These different outcomes, as far as we can see, reflect the vagaries of policy choices and economic flux, not the inherent ease or difficulty of pursuing contextualization strategies in the various domains. To all appearances, in fact, workforce development should be the most refractory terrain, since programs must engage at-risk groups and address many of the compound problems—financial, educational, familial—that notoriously vex social welfare services. The focus here, therefore, is on workforce development to illustrate an important application of our general governance principles to building good jobs; we refer to some prominent, recent cases of job attraction to underscore the difference between an approach that is deliberately sensitive to the uncertainties of context and one that deliberately is not.

Many of the most successful workforce development programs trace back to Project QUEST (Quality Employment through Skills Training), founded in San Antonio in 1992 in response to a wave of plant closings—an early portent of broader dislocations to come. The displaced workers lacked the skills for the new jobs being created in health care, IT, and other sectors; the service-sector jobs for which they were qualified paid too little to support a middle-class family. Two faith-based social movement organizations, seeing the urgent need for a program to equip the region’s largely Hispanic population for good jobs, secured municipal funding to create Project QUEST (Warren 2011).

The new project faced a double challenge. On the one hand, it had to identify emerging opportunities on the local labor market, alert the city’s community college system (then still inattentive to business needs) to them, and help shape the substance and timing of new courses to meet the needs of firms and students. On the other hand, it had to learn to support a population of high-risk learners, almost all of whom needed to pass difficult remedial courses to qualify for further study, and many of whom had family and financial burdens on top of anxieties about returning to school.

In facing these challenges, Project QUEST turned to former military members with long experience in workforce development. The first executive director was the former commander of the Air Force Recruiting Service; his successor, and many managers later hired, had a similar background. These managers brought with them not habits of military discipline and hierarchy but rather the culture of continuous improvement—the continuous monitoring of individual cases and rapid learning from disruptions at the core of our governance principles—that took root in many parts of the US military before it became standard operating procedure in much of the economy. An expression of this culture was the early creation of a dedicated management
information system, highly unusual for an organization like Project QUEST at the time, to track the performance of individual students, both to keep their counselors abreast of their progress and to allow continuing review of overall organizational performance.

To be eligible to participate in QUEST, students must demonstrate need (generally earnings of less than 50 percent of the local median wage) and levels of literacy and numeracy sufficient to ensure reasonable chances of succeeding at the intense remedial programs typically needed to prepare for the required, basic courses in community college programs. Once admitted, students design in collaboration with a counselor a bundle of “wraparound” services and supports to help them surmount stumbling blocks on the path to completing training, including subsides for tuition, child care, or rent or services to address problems of transportation, health, or domestic violence.

Counseling is continuous and intense. Students meet their counselors individually and in small, stable groups in weekly, hour-long sessions, where they share problems and devise mutual support strategies. A key purpose of these meetings is to identify and respond to emergent problems before they trigger a cascade of failure ending in withdrawal from the program. In effect, the counseling sessions in combination with information about students’ class performance allows for continuous adjustment of the wraparound support bundle.

A recent randomized controlled trial (RCT) evaluation of the earnings of QUEST participants nine years after leaving the program demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach (Roder and Elliott 2019). QUEST participants earn roughly 10 percent more per year than the control group, and the gap does not diminish—and may be growing—over time. Crucially, the difference in earnings is the greatest for the most at-risk subgroups: students who took part in QUEST when they were older than the normal school-going age, with children and additional burdens.

In recent years, as community colleges are increasingly drawn into training partnerships with local firms, more students from more diverse backgrounds seek new qualifications, and the failures of limited, “light touch” interventions to increase completion rates become more conspicuous, the schools themselves are successfully providing many of the individualized services originally offered by QUEST. A leading example is the Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP) of the City University of New York (CUNY).

Like Project QUEST, ASAP provides financial support (to bridge the gap between the available aid and tuition and other fees) and wraparound services, above all a dedicated adviser for each student who furnishes frequent
and comprehensive support. Again, a principal goal is to identify and resolve issues before a student drops out of school (Weiss et al. 2019). Cumulatively, over the course of the three-year program, these customized interventions have produced a striking increase in completion rates. Nearly 40 percent of the students in the program group in an RCT study graduated by the end of the program; the graduation rate for control group students was 22 percent. What makes ASAP uniquely successful, the authors of the study find, “is that its multiple, integrated, and well-implemented services address multiple prevalent barriers to student success, and those services are offered for three full years” (Weiss et al. 2019, 279): in our terms, continuing contextualization based on continuous monitoring.

We would expect a program designed to adjust to local circumstance to be scalable, and ASAP is proving to be. Since 2014, three Ohio community colleges have implemented ASAP, and early impact assessments show results comparable to those obtained in New York (Sommo, Cullinan, and Manno 2018). Community college leaders are following the success of ASAP closely and devising their own systems of comprehensive support, with the goal, in the words of one, of “making help unavoidable.” In the most ambitious cases, growing confidence in the ability to train low-skill workers is encouraging community colleges to enter extensive partnerships with large firms such as Amazon, where the school offers customized training and student support and the company pays tuition expenses, synchronizes the work schedule of participating employees to mesh with school needs, and, perhaps most crucially, provides a career ladder from unskilled work into management for those who complete the program.14

If workforce development programs are increasingly aware of the need for continuous learning in response to the uncertainties of context, programs that directly target employment creation by attracting inward investment seldom are. The most visible of such programs, typically administered by states rather than the federal government, are tax incentives provided to large investors in return for specific commitments on job creation. The Foxconn and Amazon deals, in Wisconsin and New York, respectively, are recent high-profile examples. The Taiwanese company Foxconn had agreed to create 13,000 well-paying jobs in Wisconsin in return for more than $4.5 billion in government incentives. Amazon promised creating 25,000 jobs over a decade in return from an incentive package from New York valued at nearly $3 billion. Both arrangements have blown up amidst controversy; their failures are instructive in ways that demonstrate the superiority of the alternative approach we are suggesting here.

Essentially, the Foxconn and Amazon deals—as well as similar tax incen-
tive programs—were predicated on ex ante contractibility (and hence a stable environment). With enough predictability about market and technology conditions, firms can make rational calculations about employment commitments. And the states have the assurance that firms will deliver. Once the contract is written down, the state remains at arms’ length from the firm. In Amazon’s case, the company said it wanted cities to “think big.” In reality, as one commentator has noted, “the creative thinking was exclusively focused on incentive offers” (Jensen 2019). If the firm turns out to be unwilling or unable to carry out the terms of the contract—as was the case with Foxconn and Amazon, the former because of unforeseen changes in demand and technology and the latter because of unexpected political fallout—there is little room for revision or renegotiation.

Bartik (2018, 2019) has studied such tax incentive programs more broadly and concludes that, even when they work, they are not very cost-effective. This is especially true when local incentives have to be financed by cuts in public expenditures elsewhere (e.g., education or infrastructure). Bartik argues that the most effective employment programs focus specifically on local labor demand and supply conditions. He emphasizes three strategies in particular. The first—and, Bartik finds, by far the most cost-effective—is the provision of customized public services to small and medium-sized enterprises. These include job training tailored to local employers and run by local community colleges, and “manufacturing extension services” that provide marketing and technology advice. The second is targeted investments in workers’ skills and training, ranging from preschool programs to wage subsidies, and the third is infrastructure programs that increase land supply and thereby lower business costs.

All three strategies are consistent with our emphasis on iterative fine-tuning and evolving standard setting in lieu of ex ante rules. The design of locally effective incentive packages along these lines obviously requires extensive information discovery and trial and error on the part of local development agencies, heightening the importance of organizational arrangements of the type we have discussed here. Note also that while Bartik’s (2018) focus is on manufacturing employment, our proposals would apply to service sectors as well. This is important since it is unlikely that the long-term, secular decline in the share of manufacturing employment can be reversed.

More broadly, good practice in industrial policy has moved away from presumptive approaches that assume the government has a good fix on the underlying problem and the requisite solutions. For example, industrial parks of enterprise zones presume that the absence of good jobs is due to, say, high taxes and poor infrastructure, and they create spaces where neither
is a problem. Such prepackaged solutions work poorly when firms face differentiated obstacles—lack of workers with appropriate skills or inadequate access to specialized technologies, for example. The collaborative framework we have outlined here has the advantage that it is explicitly diagnostic—that is, focused on information discovery.

A Reason Not to Despair and a Reason to Hope

In contrast to standard remedies that deal with the preproduction (e.g., schooling) or postproduction (e.g., taxation) stages of the economy, our approach directly targets production. The motivation is that private producers, left to their own devices, do not take the social costs of the scarcity of good jobs into account. In the absence of government action, production is not efficient. An important implication is that the traditional distinction between distribution and production no longer makes sense. Efficient production and distributive inclusion are two sides of the same coin. One cannot achieve one without the other. Questions of production—how goods and services are provided, which types of investments are made, what is the direction of technological change—are placed right at the heart of political economy and justice analysis.

We conclude on two positive notes. First, we argue that the prevailing academic pessimism about job-creating strategies may be misplaced as it is based on conflating treatments with meta-treatments. Second, we note the possibility that the governance arrangements we have sketched out may also help enlarge the constituency for acting on the problems they address.

Consider first the point about policy pessimism. The literature we have referred to when stating the problem suggests there are few, if any, policies that work reliably to expand good jobs. The conclusion that such findings often lead to is either some combination of agnosticism (as in Austin, Glaeser, and Summers 2018) or a call for more randomized evaluations (as in Autor, Li, and Notowidigdo 2019). Under our approach, these mixed results are not a surprise. The dual challenge of dealing with uncertainty and contextualization implies there are no fixed, clear-cut remedies. What is important is to get the governance regime right. With the appropriate regime in place, the hope would be that each locality can develop its own set of evolving practices. In the language of RCTs, our treatment is really a meta-treatment: a protocol for figuring out the treatment to apply in a particular setting. Correspondingly, proper evaluations would have to be carried out at the level of the governing regimes rather than individual policies.

Next, there is the point about building constituency. In many discussions
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of industrial strategy, the principal problem is creating a coalition of public and private interests in favor of development. The first task is rallying a national or local coalition of private and public actors in favor of a growth strategy with clear, immediate objectives. The formation of consensus and the clarification of objectives lead naturally to the creation of public-private partnerships to advance particular projects. The public actors contribute their expertise and authority in, say, regulation; private actors make complementary contributions with respect to markets and their firms. As long as the state retains sufficient autonomy to avoid capture, the governance of the industrial policy projects is part and parcel of the consensus that underpins the public-private partnerships.

We agree that building political will is a threshold condition for industrial policy. Full deployment of the good jobs strategy would eventually require national mobilization. But under current conditions—when development is as likely to depend on exploring and building domestic capacities as accumulating know-how and capital; when uncertainty makes the selection of goals necessarily provisional and the revision of ends and means routine—governance of a good jobs strategy can presume only a thin, initial, background consensus and does not grow directly from it. On the contrary, the fear that, under uncertainty, ambitious and urgently needed programs cannot be effectively and accountably administered could cast a shadow over consensus building, causing some potential members of a coalition in favor of a good jobs strategy to back away from a risky venture.

An attractive feature of the approach here is that the same institutions of interactive governance that enable the parties to specify and solve the problems they face under uncertainty also enable them to develop the trust and mutual reliance they need to deepen and broaden their efforts. The broad coalition needed for the good jobs strategy to succeed need not preexist; it can and will likely be the result of pursuing the strategy. Innovative modes of governance allow the parties, beginning with only a vague understanding of the substance and scope of their goals, to assess one another’s capacities and good faith in the very process of refining ideas of what the eventual project should be. Trust and coalition building—the acceptance of mutual vulnerability—are as much or more the outcome of joint problem solving as its precondition.

A further advantage of this governance approach in coalition building is its compatibility, indeed natural affinity, with efforts at broad mobilization to address societal problems under uncertainty in other domains. The Green New Deal (GND) is the most prominent example. The GND goes beyond the classic remedy of carbon pricing to contemplate large-scale in-
vestments in green technologies and ambitious programs to foster greater economic opportunities. Every which way it turns—whether confronting environmental problems or creating employment and, most especially, doing both together—the GND will wrestle with the contextualization of familiar ideas to countless local settings and the collaborative exploration of the technological frontier that gave rise to the design principles of our good jobs strategy. At bottom, that strategy enlists some of the fundamental governance lessons of successful environmentalism in the service of employment creation. It would hardly be a surprise if the GND, combining goals that only recently seemed distinct, reached similar conclusions, creating the core of a broad coalition that helps respond effectively to the economic, social, and environmental externalities presently threatening our democracies and our planet.

Notes

We thank Tim Bartik, Josh Cohen, Paul Osterman, William Simon, and participants in the Political Economy and Justice workshop for very useful comments on an earlier draft.

1. Austin, Glaeser, and Summers (2018) consider three sources of economic externalities from nonemployment: fiscal costs on the state through the tax-transfer system, costs imposed on the family, and spillovers that encourage nonemployment by others in the community. They reckon these costs range 0.21 to 0.36 times the wage of low-income workers. Our focus here is on social and political costs that we believe are much higher.

2. A similar point applies to the relationship between this chapter and the arguments made in the chapters by Henderson and by Salter in this book. We give government agencies a larger role to play because we presume that there will be some but not complete overlap between what firms find to be in their enlightened, long-term interest and what is required for inclusive social prosperity more broadly. We also differ from Weyl (this volume) in advocating a specific kind of government activism, though our approaches are guided by many of the same principles. In particular, we agree with Weyl that we should move beyond a simplistic state-market dichotomy, favor emergent social organizations, and connect social and technological change.

3. Formally cooperation between ARPA-E and recipients of research awards is governed by a cooperation agreement that specifies that the "Prime Recipient . . . is required to participate in periodic review meetings [to] . . . enable ARPA-E to assess the work performed under this Award and determine whether the Prime Recipient has timely achieved the technical milestones
and deliverables" listed in an attachment. A sample agreement is available at https://arpa-e.energy.gov/?q=site-page/funding-agreements.

4. Frank Knight classically distinguished risk—where an outcome is unknown but its probability can be estimated—from uncertainty—where it is impossible even to estimate the probability of future states of the world.


7. See Fitzgerald (2019).


10. On the possibilities for expanding the grounds for derogation beyond “natural conditions” while maintaining pressure to strive for compliance see Water Directors Meeting, “The Future of the Water Framework Directive (WFD)—Water Directors input to the fitness check process on experiences and challenges of WFD’s implementation and options for the way forward,” November 15, 2018.

11. On the Agricultural Sustainability Support and Advisory Programme (ASSAP), see https://www.teagasc.ie/environment/water-quality/farming-for-water-quality-assap/.

12. Unless otherwise indicated, this account of Project QUEST draws on Rademaker, Bear, and Conway (2001).

13. For the transformative effect of the introduction of a demanding variant of continuous improvement, developed in the US nuclear navy on the regulation of nuclear power generation, see Rees (1996).

14. Interview with David T. Harrison, president, Columbus State Community College, Columbus, Ohio, April 18, 2019.

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